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<p><img decoding="async" src="https://guptadeepak.com/content/images/2025/08/oAuth-Device-flow-vulnerability---guptadeepak.com.png" alt="OAuth Device Flow Vulnerabilities: A Critical Analysis of the 2024-2025 Attack Wave"></p><p>The cybersecurity landscape witnessed a seismic shift in 2024-2025 as threat actors, led by groups like ShinyHunters (UNC6040), systematically exploited OAuth device authorization grant vulnerabilities to compromise some of the world's largest enterprises. What makes this attack wave particularly concerning isn't just its scope—affecting millions of customer records across industries—but its methodology: sophisticated social engineering that bypasses traditional security controls without exploiting a single software vulnerability.</p><p>This research report examines the technical underpinnings of OAuth device flow vulnerabilities, analyzes the unprecedented attack campaign that targeted companies from Google to luxury fashion brands, and provides actionable insights for enterprises seeking to protect their identity and access management infrastructure.</p><div class="code-block code-block-12 ai-track" data-ai="WzEyLCIiLCJCbG9jayAxMiIsIiIsMV0=" style="margin: 8px 0; clear: both;">
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</div><p><strong>Key Findings:</strong></p><ul>
<li>Over 25% of major enterprise platforms support OAuth device flow, creating widespread attack surface</li>
<li>ShinyHunters/UNC6040 compromised dozens of high-profile organizations using voice phishing techniques</li>
<li>Traditional MFA and security controls proved ineffective against these identity-based attacks</li>
<li>The attacks represent a fundamental shift from credential theft to authorization manipulation</li>
</ul><hr><h2 id="understanding-oauth-device-flow-the-foundation-of-vulnerability">Understanding OAuth Device Flow: The Foundation of Vulnerability</h2><h3 id="what-is-oauth-device-authorization-grant">What is OAuth Device Authorization Grant?</h3><p>The OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, standardized in RFC 8628, was designed to solve a legitimate problem: how do you authenticate applications on devices with limited input capabilities? Think of smart TVs, IoT devices, or command-line tools that can't easily display a full web browser interface.</p><div class="code-block code-block-15" style="margin: 8px 0; clear: both;">
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</script></div><p>The flow works elegantly in its intended use case. When you want to authenticate Netflix on your smart TV, the TV displays a short code. You then visit a URL on your phone or computer, enter that code, and authorize the application. The TV polls the authorization server until it receives confirmation that you've completed the authentication.</p><p>This design pattern seems secure on the surface—after all, you're using a trusted device (your phone) to authenticate with a legitimate service (Netflix). However, the security model breaks down when we consider how this same mechanism can be weaponized by malicious actors.</p><h3 id="the-security-weakness-trust-without-context">The Security Weakness: Trust Without Context</h3><p>The fundamental vulnerability in OAuth device flow implementations isn't a coding error or a protocol flaw in the traditional sense. Instead, it's an assumption about user behavior and organizational controls that proves false in real-world enterprise environments.</p><p>Here's where the weakness lies: the device flow assumes that users can distinguish between legitimate and malicious authorization requests. When a user receives a code and is asked to visit an OAuth authorization URL, they're typically presented with what appears to be a legitimate authentication screen from a trusted provider like Microsoft, Google, or Salesforce.</p><p>The authorization page looks authentic because it <em>is</em> authentic—it's hosted by the legitimate OAuth provider. The attack succeeds not through technical deception, but through social manipulation of the authorization process itself.</p><h3 id="technical-deep-dive-how-the-attacks-work">Technical Deep Dive: How the Attacks Work</h3><p>Let me walk you through the attack methodology that groups like ShinyHunters have perfected:</p><p><strong>Phase 1: Social Engineering Setup</strong> The attack begins with reconnaissance and social engineering. Threat actors research their target organization, often through LinkedIn scraping and public information gathering. They identify employees who likely have access to critical systems—IT support staff, sales team members with CRM access, or administrators with broad system privileges.</p><p><strong>Phase 2: Voice Phishing (Vishing) Campaign</strong> Armed with organizational intelligence, attackers place phone calls to targeted employees. They impersonate internal IT support, external consultants, or software vendors. The social engineering is sophisticated—they use internal terminology, reference recent organizational changes, and create urgent scenarios that pressure employees to act quickly.</p><p><strong>Phase 3: OAuth Device Flow Exploitation</strong> During the phone call, attackers guide victims to authorize a malicious OAuth application. They might say something like: "We need you to authorize our new security compliance tool. Please go to <code>login.microsoftonline.com</code> and enter this code: ABC123." The victim visits the legitimate Microsoft login page, enters their credentials (potentially including MFA), and then sees an authorization screen for what appears to be a legitimate business application.</p><p><strong>Phase 4: Token Acquisition and Persistence</strong> Once the victim approves the authorization, the attacker receives OAuth access and refresh tokens with whatever permissions they requested. These tokens provide persistent access to the target's systems without requiring ongoing authentication. Unlike stolen passwords, these tokens can remain valid for extended periods and often bypass conditional access policies.</p><p><strong>Phase 5: Data Exfiltration</strong> With valid OAuth tokens, attackers can access APIs and systems as if they were the authorized user. In Salesforce attacks, this means accessing customer relationship management data, contact lists, sales pipelines, and sensitive business information. The data exfiltration often appears as normal API activity, making it difficult to detect through traditional monitoring.</p><h2 id="the-2024-2025-attack-wave-unprecedented-scale-and-sophistication">The 2024-2025 Attack Wave: Unprecedented Scale and Sophistication</h2><h3 id="shinyhunters-from-data-theft-to-enterprise-extortion">ShinyHunters: From Data Theft to Enterprise Extortion</h3><p>ShinyHunters, tracked by Google's Threat Intelligence Group as UNC6040 for intrusion activities and UNC6240 for extortion, transformed from a traditional data breach group into sophisticated enterprise attackers. Their pivot to OAuth device flow exploitation represents one of the most significant tactical evolutions in cybercrime we've observed.</p><p>The group's campaign, which intensified throughout 2024 and continued into 2025, demonstrated several concerning capabilities:</p><p><strong>Operational Sophistication</strong>: Rather than opportunistic attacks, ShinyHunters conducted systematic campaigns targeting specific industries and high-value organizations. Their victim selection showed clear business intelligence—focusing on companies with valuable customer databases and high tolerance for extortion payments.</p><p><strong>Technical Adaptability</strong>: The group quickly adapted their OAuth applications to mimic legitimate business tools. Instead of obviously malicious names, they used titles like "Data Loader," "My Ticket Portal," and "Security Compliance Tool" to increase credibility during social engineering calls.</p><p><strong>Scale and Persistence</strong>: Unlike traditional breach-and-leak operations, ShinyHunters maintained persistent access to compromised environments for months, carefully extracting data and mapping additional attack vectors before beginning extortion activities.</p><h3 id="high-profile-victims-the-scope-of-impact">High-Profile Victims: The Scope of Impact</h3><p>The breadth of organizations compromised in this campaign is staggering, spanning multiple industries and geographic regions:</p><p><strong>Technology Sector</strong>:</p><ul>
<li><strong>Google</strong>: ShinyHunters compromised Google's Salesforce environment used by the Google Ads small and medium business team, accessing customer contact information and internal sales data. Google disclosed the breach in August 2025, emphasizing that no core Google services were affected, but customer data from potential Google Ads customers was exposed.</li>
</ul><p><strong>Aviation Industry</strong>:</p><ul>
<li><strong>Qantas</strong>: The Australian airline suffered a data breach involving customer information stored in their Salesforce CRM system. While Qantas hasn't publicly confirmed the Salesforce connection, court documents reference "Accounts" and "Contacts" database tables—standard Salesforce objects.</li>
</ul><p><strong>Financial Services</strong>:</p><ul>
<li><strong>Allianz Life</strong>: Over 1.1 million customer records were compromised, including names, contact details, birth dates, and policy information. The breach occurred through unauthorized access to their third-party CRM platform on July 16, 2025.</li>
</ul><p><strong>Luxury Retail</strong>:</p><ul>
<li><strong>LVMH Group</strong> (Louis Vuitton, Dior, Tiffany & Co.): Multiple luxury brands under the LVMH umbrella were targeted, with attackers accessing high-value customer databases containing VIP client information and regional customer platforms.</li>
<li><strong>Chanel</strong>: The iconic fashion house experienced a similar breach pattern, with customer data accessed through their Salesforce environment.</li>
<li><strong>Adidas</strong>: The global sportswear brand was among the early targets, with customer and business partner information compromised.</li>
</ul><p><strong>Enterprise Software</strong>:</p><ul>
<li><strong>Workday</strong>: The human resources technology company disclosed a data breach after attackers gained access to their Salesforce CRM platform through social engineering attacks.</li>
</ul><h3 id="attack-pattern-analysis-consistency-across-victims">Attack Pattern Analysis: Consistency Across Victims</h3><p>What's particularly revealing about this campaign is the consistency of attack patterns across diverse organizations. This suggests a systematic approach rather than opportunistic targeting:</p><p><strong>Universal Salesforce Focus</strong>: Every confirmed victim in this campaign used Salesforce CRM systems. This wasn't coincidental—ShinyHunters specifically developed expertise in Salesforce OAuth exploitation, likely because of the platform's widespread enterprise adoption and valuable data repositories.</p><p><strong>Social Engineering Playbook</strong>: Across different organizations and geographic regions, witnesses reported remarkably similar phone call tactics. Attackers consistently impersonated IT support personnel, used urgent language about security compliance or system upgrades, and guided victims through OAuth authorization processes.</p><p><strong>Data Extraction Patterns</strong>: In multiple breaches, attackers focused on extracting "Accounts" and "Contacts" objects from Salesforce—standardized data types containing customer information, business contacts, and relationship data.</p><p><strong>Extortion Methodology</strong>: Rather than immediate public data leaks, ShinyHunters attempted private extortion via email, threatening data publication if ransom demands weren't met. This represents a more sophisticated monetization strategy compared to traditional breach-and-leak operations.</p><h2 id="broader-iam-industry-impact-fundamental-questions-about-trust">Broader IAM Industry Impact: Fundamental Questions About Trust</h2><h3 id="the-erosion-of-perimeter-based-security">The Erosion of Perimeter-Based Security</h3><p>The OAuth device flow attacks represent more than just another cybersecurity threat—they signal a fundamental shift in how we must think about enterprise security architecture. Traditional security models assumed a clear perimeter between trusted internal resources and untrusted external networks. OAuth attacks demonstrate that in cloud-first environments, identity has become the new perimeter, and that perimeter is far more porous than we realized.</p><p>Consider the implications: an attacker can gain persistent access to enterprise systems without compromising a single server, stealing a single password, or exploiting a single software vulnerability. They accomplish this by manipulating the very trust relationships that modern identity systems are designed to facilitate.</p><h3 id="multi-factor-authentication-necessary-but-not-sufficient">Multi-Factor Authentication: Necessary But Not Sufficient</h3><p>One of the most concerning aspects of these attacks is how they bypass multi-factor authentication while still appearing to honor security protocols. When a victim receives a phone call requesting OAuth authorization, they may dutifully enable MFA, enter their authentication codes, and complete what appears to be a secure authentication process.</p><p>The problem is that MFA protects the authentication step but doesn't address the authorization decision. Once authenticated, the user is presented with an OAuth consent screen that may request broad permissions. In many enterprise environments, users have been trained to click through consent screens without careful review—after all, they're authenticating with "legitimate" business applications.</p><p>This exposes a critical gap in security education and user experience design. We've successfully trained users to enable MFA and protect their passwords, but we haven't adequately prepared them to evaluate OAuth authorization requests.</p><h3 id="enterprise-saas-sprawl-amplifying-attack-surface">Enterprise SaaS Sprawl: Amplifying Attack Surface</h3><p>Modern enterprises typically use hundreds of SaaS applications, many of which integrate through OAuth protocols. Each integration represents a potential attack vector, and the complexity of managing OAuth permissions across diverse platforms creates blind spots that attackers can exploit.</p><p>Our research identified that approximately 75% of major identity providers support OAuth device flow by default or allow easy enabling. DevOps platforms like GitLab and GitHub have device flow enabled by default, as do major cloud infrastructure providers and communication platforms.</p><p>This creates a mathematical certainty: in an environment with hundreds of SaaS applications, dozens of which support device flow, the probability of successful OAuth exploitation approaches 1.0 over time, especially when combined with sophisticated social engineering.</p><h3 id="the-vendor-trust-problem">The Vendor Trust Problem</h3><p>The OAuth attacks also expose fundamental questions about vendor trust relationships. When an organization adopts Salesforce, they're not just buying CRM software—they're inheriting Salesforce's OAuth trust model, API architecture, and security assumptions.</p><p>If Salesforce (or any SaaS provider) has OAuth vulnerabilities or overly permissive default configurations, those vulnerabilities become part of your organization's attack surface. You can't patch them, you can't configure them away, and you often can't even visibility into them.</p><p>This represents a significant shift in enterprise risk management. Traditional software security focused on vulnerabilities you could control—patch management, configuration hardening, network segmentation. SaaS security requires managing risks in systems you don't control, using trust models you didn't design, with visibility limited by vendor APIs and logging capabilities.</p><h2 id="technical-mitigation-strategies-defending-the-new-perimeter">Technical Mitigation Strategies: Defending the New Perimeter</h2><h3 id="identity-centric-security-controls">Identity-Centric Security Controls</h3><p>Given that OAuth attacks succeed through identity manipulation rather than technical exploitation, defensive strategies must focus on identity-centric controls:</p><p><strong>Conditional Access Policies</strong>: Modern identity providers offer conditional access capabilities that can require additional verification for OAuth consent requests. Organizations should implement policies that flag unusual OAuth authorization patterns—new applications, broad permission requests, or authorizations from unusual locations or devices.</p><p><strong>OAuth Application Governance</strong>: Every enterprise should maintain an inventory of authorized OAuth applications and regularly audit permissions. This requires both technical tooling and governance processes. Applications requesting excessive permissions should trigger security reviews, and orphaned OAuth grants should be automatically revoked.</p><p><strong>Device Flow Restrictions</strong>: For organizations that don't require device flow functionality, the simplest mitigation is disabling it entirely. Our research found that most enterprises can disable device flow without operational impact, since legitimate use cases are relatively rare in typical business environments.</p><h3 id="user-education-and-awareness">User Education and Awareness</h3><p>Traditional security awareness training focuses on password security and email phishing recognition. OAuth attack prevention requires expanding this education to cover authorization decisions:</p><p><strong>Authorization Skepticism</strong>: Users need training to approach OAuth authorization requests with appropriate skepticism, especially when prompted during phone calls or urgent situations. The training should emphasize that legitimate IT requests should go through established channels and allow time for verification.</p><p><strong>Application Recognition</strong>: Employees should understand how to identify legitimate business applications versus potentially malicious ones. This includes checking application publishers, reviewing requested permissions carefully, and understanding the business justification for application access.</p><p><strong>Escalation Procedures</strong>: Organizations need clear procedures for employees to escalate suspicious authorization requests. This might include dedicated security hotlines, Slack channels, or email addresses where employees can verify requests before granting access.</p><h3 id="technical-implementation-recommendations">Technical Implementation Recommendations</h3><p><strong>Real-Time OAuth Monitoring</strong>: Organizations need capabilities to monitor OAuth authorizations in real-time. This includes detecting new application authorizations, identifying applications requesting excessive permissions, and flagging authorization patterns that deviate from normal user behavior.</p><p><strong>API Activity Monitoring</strong>: Since OAuth attacks ultimately manifest as API activity, monitoring API usage patterns can help detect data exfiltration. Unusual volumes of data requests, access to sensitive data objects, or API activity during non-business hours should trigger security alerts.</p><p><strong>Zero Trust Architecture</strong>: OAuth attacks succeed partly because traditional network security assumes that authenticated users should have broad access to resources. Zero trust architectures limit access based on specific application and data needs, reducing the impact of compromised OAuth tokens.</p><h2 id="industry-response-and-future-outlook">Industry Response and Future Outlook</h2><h3 id="vendor-accountability-and-platform-security">Vendor Accountability and Platform Security</h3><p>The OAuth attack wave has prompted significant responses from major technology vendors:</p><p><strong>Microsoft</strong> has enhanced Azure AD conditional access policies to provide more granular control over OAuth consent processes. They've also improved audit logging for OAuth applications and introduced automated detection for suspicious OAuth activity.</p><p><strong>Google</strong> has implemented additional verification requirements for OAuth applications requesting sensitive permissions and enhanced their review processes for applications in their OAuth ecosystem.</p><p><strong>Salesforce</strong> published detailed guidance for customers on securing connected applications and implemented additional monitoring capabilities for unusual API access patterns.</p><p>However, these vendor responses, while valuable, address only part of the problem. The fundamental challenge is that OAuth security depends on user decision-making, and no amount of technical controls can completely eliminate social engineering risks.</p><h3 id="regulatory-and-compliance-implications">Regulatory and Compliance Implications</h3><p>The OAuth attacks have also attracted regulatory attention, particularly in jurisdictions with strict data protection requirements:</p><p><strong>GDPR Implications</strong>: European organizations affected by OAuth attacks face potential regulatory scrutiny under GDPR, particularly regarding their technical and organizational measures to protect personal data. The fact that attacks succeeded through social engineering rather than technical exploitation doesn't absolve organizations of compliance obligations.</p><p><strong>Industry Standards Evolution</strong>: Security frameworks like NIST and ISO 27001 are beginning to incorporate identity-centric security controls that address OAuth and similar authorization-based attacks. Future compliance requirements will likely include specific controls for OAuth application management.</p><h3 id="the-future-of-identity-security">The Future of Identity Security</h3><p>Looking ahead, the OAuth attack wave represents just one example of how attackers are adapting to cloud-first, identity-centric IT environments. We can expect to see continued evolution in several areas:</p><p><strong>Behavioral Analytics</strong>: Future identity security platforms will increasingly rely on behavioral analytics to detect unusual authorization patterns, application usage, and data access behaviors.</p><p><strong>Zero Trust Integration</strong>: OAuth security will become more tightly integrated with zero trust architectures, ensuring that even authorized applications have limited access to sensitive resources.</p><p><strong>Enhanced User Experience</strong>: Security vendors will need to balance security controls with user experience, providing clear, intuitive interfaces for OAuth authorization decisions while maintaining strong security defaults.</p><h2 id="recommendations-for-enterprise-leaders">Recommendations for Enterprise Leaders</h2><h3 id="immediate-actions">Immediate Actions</h3><p>Every enterprise should take immediate steps to assess and mitigate OAuth-related risks:</p><p><strong>Conduct OAuth Inventory</strong>: Identify all OAuth applications currently authorized in your environment. Many organizations discover they have hundreds of authorized applications, many of which are no longer needed or were authorized without proper review.</p><p><strong>Review Device Flow Configuration</strong>: Determine whether OAuth device flow is enabled in your identity providers and whether it's necessary for your business operations. If not required, disable it entirely.</p><p><strong>Implement Monitoring</strong>: Deploy monitoring capabilities for OAuth authorizations and API activity. At minimum, you should receive alerts when new applications are authorized or when existing applications exhibit unusual usage patterns.</p><p><strong>Update Security Training</strong>: Expand security awareness training to cover OAuth authorization decisions and social engineering tactics focused on identity manipulation.</p><h3 id="strategic-considerations">Strategic Considerations</h3><p>Beyond immediate tactical responses, the OAuth attack wave requires strategic thinking about enterprise security architecture:</p><p><strong>Identity-First Security Strategy</strong>: Organizations need to evolve beyond network-centric security models toward identity-first approaches that assume identity compromise is inevitable and build controls accordingly.</p><p><strong>Vendor Risk Management</strong>: SaaS vendor selection should include detailed evaluation of OAuth security capabilities, audit logging, and incident response procedures. Vendor security questionnaires should specifically address OAuth application management.</p><p><strong>Security Operations Evolution</strong>: Security operations centers need capabilities to investigate identity-based attacks, which often leave different forensic traces compared to traditional network-based attacks.</p><h3 id="long-term-vision">Long-Term Vision</h3><p>The ultimate goal should be creating organizational resilience against identity-based attacks:</p><p><strong>Culture of Authorization Skepticism</strong>: Build organizational culture that treats authorization requests with appropriate skepticism while maintaining operational efficiency.</p><p><strong>Integrated Security Architecture</strong>: Develop security architectures that seamlessly integrate identity controls, application security, and data protection without creating operational friction.</p><p><strong>Continuous Adaptation</strong>: Accept that attack methodologies will continue evolving and build security programs capable of adapting to new threat vectors without requiring complete architectural overhauls.</p><h2 id="conclusion-the-new-reality-of-enterprise-security">Conclusion: The New Reality of Enterprise Security</h2><p>The OAuth device flow attacks of 2024-2025 represent a watershed moment in enterprise cybersecurity. They demonstrate that in cloud-first, SaaS-centric IT environments, the most sophisticated attacks often target the weakest link: human decision-making in authorization processes.</p><p>What makes this attack wave particularly significant isn't just its immediate impact—though the millions of compromised customer records and dozens of affected organizations certainly matter—but what it reveals about the fundamental security challenges we face in modern IT environments.</p><p>Traditional cybersecurity focused on building walls and monitoring network traffic. OAuth attacks succeed by walking through the front door with valid credentials and authorized access. They represent a category of attack that bypasses most traditional security controls not through technical sophistication, but through exploitation of trust relationships that are essential to modern business operations.</p><p>The response to these attacks can't be to abandon OAuth or retreat from cloud-first IT strategies—these technologies provide too much business value and operational efficiency. Instead, we need to evolve our security thinking to match the reality of identity-centric IT environments.</p><p>This means accepting that perfect security is impossible and focusing on resilience: How quickly can we detect unusual authorization patterns? How effectively can we limit the impact of compromised OAuth tokens? How efficiently can we investigate and respond to identity-based attacks?</p><p>The organizations that successfully adapt to this new reality will be those that combine technical controls with human factors considerations, that balance security with usability, and that treat identity security as a core business capability rather than just an IT concern.</p><p>As we continue to navigate this evolving threat landscape, one thing is certain: the OAuth attacks of 2024-2025 won't be the last time attackers find innovative ways to exploit the trust relationships that underpin modern enterprise technology. Our security strategies must evolve accordingly.</p><p>The future of enterprise security lies not in building higher walls, but in creating more intelligent trust relationships—systems that can distinguish between legitimate and malicious authorization requests, that can adapt to new attack patterns, and that can maintain operational efficiency while protecting against sophisticated social engineering.</p><p>The OAuth attacks have taught us a valuable lesson: in a world where identity is the new perimeter, we must defend it with the same rigor and sophistication we once reserved for network security. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.</p><hr><p><em>Deepak Gupta is a serial entrepreneur and cybersecurity expert, currently serving as Co-founder and CEO of GrackerAI. His experience building and scaling cybersecurity companies, provides unique insights into the intersection of identity management and enterprise security. </em></p><p><em>Connect with him on </em><a href="https://linkedin.com/in/dpgupta"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em> or </em><a href="https://twitter.com/dip_ak"><em>X</em></a><em> to discuss AI-powered cybersecurity solutions and identity security strategies.</em></p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2025/08/oauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave/" data-a2a-title="OAuth Device Flow Vulnerabilities: A Critical Analysis of the 2024-2025 Attack Wave"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2025%2F08%2Foauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave%2F&linkname=OAuth%20Device%20Flow%20Vulnerabilities%3A%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20of%20the%202024-2025%20Attack%20Wave" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2025%2F08%2Foauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave%2F&linkname=OAuth%20Device%20Flow%20Vulnerabilities%3A%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20of%20the%202024-2025%20Attack%20Wave" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2025%2F08%2Foauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave%2F&linkname=OAuth%20Device%20Flow%20Vulnerabilities%3A%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20of%20the%202024-2025%20Attack%20Wave" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2025%2F08%2Foauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave%2F&linkname=OAuth%20Device%20Flow%20Vulnerabilities%3A%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20of%20the%202024-2025%20Attack%20Wave" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2025%2F08%2Foauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave%2F&linkname=OAuth%20Device%20Flow%20Vulnerabilities%3A%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20of%20the%202024-2025%20Attack%20Wave" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://guptadeepak.com/">Deepak Gupta | AI &amp; Cybersecurity Innovation Leader | Founder&#039;s Journey from Code to Scale</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Deepak Gupta - Tech Entrepreneur, Cybersecurity Author">Deepak Gupta - Tech Entrepreneur, Cybersecurity Author</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://guptadeepak.com/oauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave/">https://guptadeepak.com/oauth-device-flow-vulnerabilities-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2024-2025-attack-wave/</a> </p>
